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Abstract
The role of public bureaucracy has been one of the most discussed characteristics of a state,
especially if the political system of a particular state is in a developing stage. In Nepal, up to 1990
the absolute power of monarchy was maintained through a traditional or a pre-modern
bureaucracy typically comprised of the caste and class elites. Merit was a superficial criterion.
According to Riggs (1994) when non-merit appointees are able to retain their status as
bureaucrats, they typically become a powerful political force. Compounded by their want of
administrative qualifications, they start forming self protective networks in order to safeguard their
special interests, especially their right to stay in office. Riggs calls these bureaucrats “retainers”
and goes on to explain that after these retainers have held office for a long enough time, they
become so well entrenched that they can successfully resist all efforts to accomplish significant
reforms. Although Nepal has ushered in a modern system of government, the bureaucracy has
hardly changed its pre-modern color. Today Nepal teeters dangerously towards political chaos.
Corruption is rampant, unaccountability is rife and there is a gaping socio-political inequality. The
reason why the Nepalese case is so interesting is that although the governing mechanism has a
fairly modern, legal-rational base, the bureaucracy still holds its “traditional” hue. Is it theoretically
possible to have a legal rational political system and a pre-modern bureaucracy at the same
time? Does the traditionally inclined, un-evolving retainer bureaucracy act as an impediment to
smooth functioning of a democratically elected, legal rational government? The paper seeks to
answer these questions.
Key words: traditional bureaucracy, Nepal, hierarchy
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“It is easier to write a constitution than to run one”.—Woodrow Wilson (1887)

Introduction
The relationship between public bureaucracy and democracy has been explored
for over a century now by various experts and academicians. Some have
stressed the indispensable interdependence between the two and others have
deliberated on the pathologies of bureaucracy and its adverse effect on efficient
and effective governing. However, fact remains that the relationship between
bureaucratic elites and political elites has always been one of the most important
characteristic of modern governments. As Farazmand (1997) writes, relationship
between bureaucracy and politics, as an independent variable may even explain
the degree of success and failure in governing empires, nation-states and citystates because their leadership, standards and behavior set the tone of all
institutes of the government, their relationship at the apex of the governmental
hierarchy acts as an example for all those who work in and for the government
and determines the attitudes of the citizens towards their governments.

Early in the study of governance public administration was recognized as the
most obvious part of government. Wilson (1887) wrote that public administration
is the government in action; it is the executive, the operative and is as old as
government itself. As Sayre (1978) opined, the concept of public administration is
deeply rooted in political theory. If politics stresses methods and values,
administration is the tool to incorporate those methods and values.
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Public bureaucracy is an integral part of policy process and governance in
general. The relationship between bureaucrats and politicians is mixed and
interactive, fluid and integrative and in order to promote efficient and effective
administration and governance, they have to work together. Bureaucracy then is
a part of the whole political apparatus or a regime type and is bound to have
characteristics similar to that of the regime it is operating under. In other words,
regime types have important effects on the structure and performance of their
bureaucracies (Riggs, 2002) and bureaucracies’ performances in turn influence
the survivability of those regimes.

The transformation of monarchic authoritarianism into democracy, fueled by
notions of popular sovereignty, majority rules and safeguards for minorities
usually occurs with the rise of industrialism and modernity. Now, although we
cannot term present day Nepal as a pre-modern state, it does not have the
prerequisites of an industrialized nation either. It is still largely agrarian and has
strong feudal societal base comprised of age-old caste system. However,
democracy, at least in spirit was ushered into present day Nepal in 1990 after a
popular uprising that upstaged the absolute rule of King Birendra.

The Constitution of 1990 incorporated western democratic concepts such as
majority rule, multi-partisanship, bi-cameral legislature and separation of powers.
The governing mechanisms along with various legislative and administrative
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organizations of the country suddenly had “democratic overhaul”. With a
government which now had more or less a legal rational base with a written
constitution, elected representatives and majoritarianism, it was expected that
the bureaucracy of the state to also have legal rational hues. However, rooted in
traditional orthodoxy Nepalese bureaucracy has a strong “retainer” culture that
has proved difficult to discard. The prevailing psyche among Nepalese
bureaucrats typically searches for political masters to please and depend upon
for continuation of office. This attitude stems from age-old norm of
institutionalizing charisma (Weber, 1922) which in turn makes them lose the
essential bureaucratic attributes of neutrality and competence. The paper tries to
analyze how lack of modern, legal rational bureaucracy impedes democratic
development of a transitional state such as Nepal.

Bureaucracy as a Concept
The term bureaucracy usually comes under scathing attacks as being too
mechanistic, controlling and cumbersome (Hummel, 1997, Farmer, 2005). All of
these charges are accurate, especially in regards to bureaucratic and post
bureaucratic societies; however, it is a word that has demonstrated a great
staying power and even most of its critics have concluded that there is more to
be gained by keeping it than by abandoning it (Heady, 1995).
The dominant tendency is to define bureaucracy in terms of an organization’s
basic structural characteristics. From Weber on, most writers on bureaucracy
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have enumerated the structural dimensions of bureaucracy, with minor variations
in their formulations, both in content and breakdown of items, but with substantial
agreement among them (Heady, 1995). Similarly, Max Weber’s views on
bureaucracy, despite substantial qualification and revision remains the dominant
paradigm for the study of administration and formal organizations (Rudolph,
1979).

Weber, perhaps the most respected writer on bureaucracy theorized that the role
of public bureaucracy is to implement policy. According to him, the political
leadership leads, the bureaucracy follows (Keith, 1985). Weber theorized that a
rational, efficient and achievement oriented bureaucracy must emphasize on
political neutrality, hierarchy, specialization of tasks and knowledge, formal
communication and record management and objective standards and impersonal
rules which would ensure organizational reliability and predictability (Keith, 1985).

For the position of the bureaucrat Weber says that office holding is a vocation.
This is shown in the requirement of a firmly prescribed course of training, which
demands the entire capacity for a long period of time, and in the generally
prescribed and special examinations which are prerequisites of employment
(Weber, 1922). The pure type of bureaucratic official is appointed by a superior
authority and he usually holds his position for life. An official elected by the
governed is not a purely bureaucratic figure. Similarly, the official receives the
regular pecuniary compensation of a normally fixed salary and the old age
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security provided by a pension and is set for a “career” within the hierarchical
order of the public service (Weber, 1922).

According to Hummel (1977), a bureaucrat has to be a “truncated remnant of a
human being who is allowed to feel only those emotions specified in the work
orders”. Hummel quotes Weber and states that the norms of bureaucratic life are
precision, stability, stringency of discipline, reliability, calculability of results,
formal rationality, formalistic impersonality and formal equality of treatment.

As per Weber’s classic bureaucratic model, modern bureaucracy is usually
defined as having five distinct characteristics such as political neutrality,
hierarchical in composition, specialization of tasks and knowledge, having formal
communication and record management as well as objective standards and
impersonal rules which would ensure organizational reliability and predictability
(Weber, 1922). However, Hummel (2000) adds that merely instituting these
characteristics does not produce modern government or modern civilization in
general. Bureaucracy then cannot be allowed to be defined only by its inner
characteristics but must be defined within the context within which it was formed.

Bureaucracy and Regime Types,
To fully understand Weber’s ideas about bureaucracy, it is necessary to begin
with the framework of his political sociology in which the concept of bureaucracy
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finds its place. Weber felt that all power requires a belief in its legitimacy if it is to
become stabilized therefore he set up his famous typology of the grounds on
which a claim to legitimacy may be based. The first is the legal rational basis
(Weber, 1922), in which legitimacy rests on “a belief in the “legality’ of patterns of
normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to
issue commands. It is a democratic bureaucracy which functions with a pluralistic
power structure and is perceived as a means (Constas, 1958).

The second one is totalitarian organization resulting from the institutionalization
of charisma in a bureaucratic direction which is an end in itself. According to
Weber, in this kind of organization, legitimacy rests on an established belief in
the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those
exercising authority under them. Obedience is owed to the person or the chief
who occupies the traditionally sanctioned position of authority and who is, within
its sphere bound by tradition (Weber, 1922; Constas, 1958). Weber called this
kind of bureaucratic setting “charismatic bureaucracy” where charismatic or nonrational elements overshadow and sharply limit the use or area of rationality. This
kind of bureaucracy has number of important consequences such as it sharply
limits the area of rationality on bureaucratic recruitment and the prerequisites for
strictly bureaucratic recruitment are impaired (Weber, 1922; Constas, 1958;
Heady, 2001). To the degree that bureaucratic elements are present, ideological
commitment, as well as technical competence, must necessarily figure in
bureaucratic recruitment. It may even supersede it. Hence, purges, orthodoxy,
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and hewing to the party line will inevitably arise at every level in a charismatic
bureaucracy (Riggs, 2002; Constas, 1958).

Weber’s theory of charismatic and rational bureaucracy states that a more open
society will have more rational, democratic and accountable bureaucracy
whereas an autocratic one will have an irrational and corrupt bureaucracy.
Constas writes of Weber’s charismatic bureaucracy, that they are irresponsible
and totalitarian. Hierarchical order, all embracing moral claims, divisions into the
orthodox and the heterodox, and the sense of mission and salvation of mankind
mark them all. While charismatic bureaucracy undergoes change and adaptation
and may, indeed prove to be highly flexible, certain fundamental dogmas can
never be given up (Constas, 1958). A question therefore comes to mind; are
there any basic characteristics which delineate the rational bureaucratic polity as
a special type of social and political system? Eisenstadt believes that there are
two main interdependent characteristics; the distinctiveness of political goals in
the society and the need for special organizations for the mobilizations of
different types of support that distinguish bureaucratic societies from traditional
ones (Eisenstadt, 1956).

Bureaucracy in the Nepalese Context
.In 1959, the Public Service Commission was adopted as a fundamental feature
of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal which marked the beginning of a role
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of the Commission in recruitment of the civil servants. After the coup and the
subsequent Constitution of 1962, the Commission retained in paper, its
prerogatives to advice on recruitment, promotions, terms and conditions and
punishments of civil servants (Khanal, 2007). However, under the authoritarian
rule of King Mahendra, the role of the Commission stared eroding as more and
more civil servants were hired solely on the basis of loyalty towards the King and
his regime. The King as an incarnation of Vishnu had all the charisma and
authority and deserved total obedience from his subjects, including the
bureaucrats. It was their duty to fulfill his commands.

The seeds of traditional or charismatic bureaucracy were sown long before the
reign of King Mahendra. As Arjunmani A. Dikshit (2007) writes,

Looking at the long hierarchy of positions in assistant level
during the Rana period, it can be said that the idea behind
creating so many layers and positions in lower levels was
designed to prevent common people from reaching higher level
positions. In a nutshell, the principle of higher the family status,
the higher the position in public service was observed (p. 121).i

It is therefore clear that the existing bureaucracy in Nepal had no legal rational base
whatsoever. This deeply rooted traditional bureaucratic culture lingers till date among
bureaucrats and political actors alike. Elected rulers, like their autocratic predecessors
continue to disregard the rights and the privileges of the Commission guaranteed by the
Constitution. Even after the restoration of democracy in 1990, key political affairs
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continued to get operated by the same elites that controlled, influenced and
manipulated the economy and politics of the previous regime (Subedi, 2001).

Public Service Commission struggles to maintain formal characteristics of bureaucracy
in Nepal as every function of the Commission is carried out in accordance to the will of
those in the government, including recruiting of personnel and providing job security to
public servants (Khanal, 2007, Dikshit, 2007). Likewise, public service examinations are
poorly conducted; examinations conducted by zonal and regional offices lack adequate
supervision and proper compliance of Constitutional guidelines (Khanal, 2007). There is
also an evident lack of compliance of Public Service Commission’s guidelines on
delegated authority regarding recruitment and promotions. Whereas financial
irregularities get ample public attention, administrative irregularities hardly ever gets
noticed. In addition, current climate of political uncertainty has added burden in
maintaining an efficient administrative process (Nepal, 2007).

Bureaucracy in Nepal does not have a neutral stand as political parties in power tend to
use civil servants to their benefits. In theory, constitutionally empowered higher level
civil servants are able to promote broad public interests and prevent politicians’ potential
abuse of power and privilege in serving powerful particularistic interests (Farazmand,
1997). However, in the case of Nepal, constitutional measures are rendered ineffective
in the face of traditional bureaucratic norms.
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Retainer Bureaucracy
The bureaucratic model, by its very formulation, has tended to produce an
overemphasis on organization as a variable; a situation often exacerbated by the kinds
of data available (Heeger, 1973). There are numerous historical data on the growth of
bureaucracies in the developing states collected by bureaucracies themselves which
tend to attribute those bureaucracies all the concreteness of their counterparts in the
developed states; the physical apparatus of buildings and files, the staffs, the
hierarchies, and in theory at least the procedures whereas political institutions seem
disorganized at best, legislatures seem devoid of procedure and tradition (Heeger,
1973). Fred Riggs (2002) termed these seemingly modern organizations “formalistic”
which according to him are common among transitional societies.

“Transitional societies” having a mixture of the traditional and modern, are
according to Riggs (1964), “prismatic” social systems. Riggs explains that the
administrative characteristics of the prismatic society include “overlapping”
interrelationships among administrative organizations; “heterogeneous” attitudes,
practices and situations; and formalistic systems.

On assumption that the political system type would be the most crucial standard
for distinguishing among the public bureaucracies of developing countries, Heady
(1995) adopted a classification plan that was designed to place special emphasis
on the relationship between the basic political characteristics of the regime and
the political role of bureaucracy in the system. He categorized them as traditional
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autocratic system, bureaucratic elite system, polyarchal competitive system,
dominant party semi-competitive system, dominant party mobilization system and
communist totalitarian systems (Heady, 1995).

According to Heady, the dominant political elites in traditional autocratic regimes
owe their power position to a long established social system, which usually
emphasized inherited monarchic or aristocratic social status, but may also have a
religious legitimizing base. This description is befitting to the Nepalese case as
caste based aristocracy as well as monarchy with religious overtones dictated
the administrative apparatus of the state for centuries. Heady further stated that
the ruling cluster of families in such a regime must rely on the army and civil
bureaucracy both as instrumentalities of change and as inhibitors of unwanted
change.

In Nepal, up to 1990 the absolute power of monarchy was maintained through a
traditional or a pre-modern bureaucracy typically comprised of the caste and
class elites. Merit was a superficial criterion. The trend still continues with elected
rulers arbitrarily granting office along partisan and ideological lines.
According to Riggs (1994) when non-merit appointees are able to retain their
status as bureaucrats, they typically become a powerful political force.
Compounded by their want of administrative qualifications, they start forming self
protective networks in order to safeguard their special interests, especially their
right to stay in office. Riggs calls these bureaucrats “retainers” and goes on to
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explain that after these retainers have held office for a long enough time, they
become so well entrenched that they can successfully resist all efforts to
accomplish significant reforms. These appointees who hold positions granted by
superior authorities on the basis of personal and partisan considerations are
much more likely to abuse their powers, especially if they are not well paid and
not well monitored by extra bureaucratic (constitutional) institutions (Riggs,
2002).

This system requires reciprocity; retainers support their masters but also depend
on them for continuation of their offices (Riggs, 2002). Therefore there is a strong
interdependence between those in power and those running the administration.
Rulers ask for favors from these bureaucrats for them and their kin and the
bureaucrats in turn ensure the continuation of their office by complying. Since
retainers can expect to remain in office for a long time, they tend to cultivate
informal associations with their colleagues to strengthen their hold on office and
their ability to resist reforms (Riggs, 2002) that might replace them. These types
of bureaucracies are obviously less competent. The values that they hold are
incompatible with ethos of democracy and rule of law therefore they are more
inclined to go against constitutional regimes.

Riggs also talks about his “Sala” model in transitional society and states that
nepotism is the most prevalent mode of recruitment in which personal ties
dominate appointments. According to him, rewards of office include hope for

14

power as well and that candidates for office are as much concerned with the
power potential of a position as the appointing officers are with the impact of
appointments on their own power position than on administrative consequences
(Riggs; 1964). Given a choice between loyalty and competence in a subordinate,
the Sala official chooses loyalty, Riggs states. Therefore the question becomes,
is democratic process possible without a mechanism for insuring the political
goals of equality, legitimacy, liberty and responsibility? (Cox, 1987)

Conclusion
The ability of any democratic government to work depends on its capacity to
maintain and control a body of officials able and willing to implement fundamental
policies made outside the bureaucracy (Riggs, 1997, Heady, 1995). The
relationship between regime and bureaucracy is reciprocal. Bureaucracies
influence constitutions and vice versa. Likewise, bureaucracies may help
constitutions survive or undermine them. Within a democratic regime,
bureaucracy is a means to assure the application of the authority of law
conceived as a coherent system of rules for which rational grounds can be given
(Hummel, 2000). This type of regimes require not only a rational legislative
procedure but also an administrative procedure that follows and nurtures faith in
the rule of law; law that must be transparent as to its justifications and apply to all
alike. In case of an absence of such a type of administration, democratic regime
loses its legal rational color and subsequently its very existence gets threatened.
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In Weber’s words, democracy requires legal rational bureaucracy instead of
administration by the “notables” that takes place when the upper strata of a nondemocratic society control public administration (Richardson, 1997).

The presence of retainer bureaucracy in Nepal is deeply rooted in the form of
chakari i.e. the concept of appeasing one’s senior and afno mancheii syndrome.
Decisions are made and appointments determined due to pressing obligations
from these well established norms. Academic qualifications, training background,
work experiences, integrity of character and other such attributes are not as
important or helpful as belonging to a powerful circle of associates with
connections in high offices in the government. According to Bista (1991), almost
every activity within the society is influenced by afno manche syndrome: the
length of time to cash a check, the treatment one receives in hospital, even a
child’s success at school. These inherent trends impede the development of
democratic norms such as equality before the law and equality of opportunity. In
addition, typically bureaucratic traits such as political neutrality and impersonal
rules get eroded. This would result in setting up formal structures that imitate
bureaucratic functions but whose actual operations are deviated from the legal
rational path by the prevailing indigenous culture (Hummel, 2002).

. The administrative machinery is the principal vehicle for action, but its ability to
operate effectively is hampered by its own traditional characteristics, by its
embryonic conditions and by the difficulty it faces in penetrating the community
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(Heady, 1995). Therefore, a modern, legal rational bureaucracy is a precursor to
smooth functioning of a democratic government.

As Waldo (1987, p.75) writes, traditional institutions in themselves do not
guarantee democracy; indeed they may impede it. ….There is but one grand
purpose, namely to make democracy work today in our national government; that
is to make our government an up-to-date, efficient and effective instrument for
carrying out the will of the nation,” “security, steadier employment, better living
and working conditions,” and so forth. “Without results we know that democracy
means nothing and ceases to be alive in the minds and hearts of men.”
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i

Ranas belong to an aristocratic clan that ruled Nepal for nearly a century. They were the hereditary rulers
who reduced the Shah Kings to mere titular heads and ruled Nepal as its Prime Ministers. Their rule was
absolute, authoritarian and despotic.
ii
Inner circle of political or social associates

20

